But there is room for the twisted and memorable phrase when used with discretion. What real estate student can forget Lord Macnaghten`s famous remark that « it is one thing to get to the heart of a business like Shelley`s, and quite another to stop there » (Van Grutten v Foxwell [1897] AC 658, 671)? And what about Lord Atkins` simple question in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580, « Then who is my neighbour by law? » that preceded his enduring classical definition of negligence due diligence? These are surpassed in simplicity and persuasion only by Bowen LJ`s famous observation that « the state of mind of a man is as much a fact as the state of his digestion » (Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459, 483). The favourite of some, especially those who share this preference for leisure, is a remark by Lord Reid in Gollin`s AC 644, 664: « No one but a lawyer would say that it must be assumed that I intended to put my ball in the bunker because that was the natural and probable result of my shot. » By: Cur. vult in the Australian Law Dictionary » Curia advisari vult is a Latin legal term meaning « the court wants to consider the matter » (literally « the court wants to be deliberated »), a term that reserves judgment for a later day. It often appears in case reports, abbreviated as « Cur. Adv. vult » or sometimes « c.a.v. » or « CAV » when the Chamber takes time to deliberate after hearing arguments from defence counsel. [1] [2] The Latin legal term curia advisari vult (abbreviation cur adv vult), meaning « the court wishes to consider the matter » (literally « to be advised »), is familiar to most members of the British legal system and appears in thousands of legal opinions. It could be argued that Latin has no place in modern judgment. However, some will say that its use is perfectly acceptable, provided that the public understands what is being said, or that it can be explained easily and quickly, for example by a legal representative to the customer. (Latin Curia advisare vult, the court wants to be deliberated, which means « superior ») Cur adv vult or CAV are abbreviations of Curia advisari vult, Latin for « the court wanted to be advised ». It is used in a legal report to indicate that the judgment was reserved for the court, rather than being rendered extemporally. One of the characteristics of our common law system is that those appointed to judicial office are not trained judges, which is in stark contrast to other legal systems.
For example, Sir John Megaw, the highly respected Chancery judge who was previously a leading silk and commercial rugby player, reportedly said when he was appointed a Supreme Court Justice that he felt like a player who was pulled from the crowd, whistled and ordered to move on and referee the game. Until a few years ago, the situation was no different. There should have been an idea of how judges should carry out their duties from regular work in court. We received no formal training or support in practical matters such as judgment writing, but we were expected to absorb this by hearing and reading judgments in practice and writing endless opinions. Other regular regulars of legal opinions are the « fragile legal history » judgments, which Newark rather briefly dismisses as a true legal historian, because they are based on half-memorized knowledge from the judge`s time as a student; and the « too clear for arguments » type, of which Lord Halsbury LC was a famous representative. L. Lat. The court is deliberated; The court will consider this issue. A phrase often found in the reports and decision of the court means suspending judgment in a case after the dispute until they have deliberated on the matter whether it is a new or difficult point. It is commonly abbreviated to cur. Adv.
vult, or c. a., v. Curia cancellariae officina justitiae. 2 Inst 552. The Court of Chancery is the workshop of justice. To return to the theme of the Latin maxim: interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium captures a concept to which Polonius gave a memorable expression in Shakespeare`s Hamlet and whose taste applies willingly to this already long revelation. Ergo, I have trouble finding the right word (a diplomatic quid pro quo – oops, another – for our Gallic neighbors) and so I ended my case. The term concise or colourful is another characteristic of judgments in a common law jurisdiction. Some judges have made it their trademark, such as Lord Denning. Some may prefer the opening sentence of Lord Devlin`s speech in McCutcheon v David MacBrayne Ltd [1964] 1 All ER 430, 435: « If a person in Islay wishes to send goods to the mainland, he goes to the office of MacBrayne (the respondent) in Port Askaig, conveniently connected to the local post office. » As in one of Horace`s odes, one could not change a word without interfering with the flow of language, and the reader quickly senses that the legal artillery is rumbling to defend the rights of the humble islander over the evil shipping company that tries to rely on the fine print in its conditions of transport. Although the equivalent is unthinkable in modern judgment, there is complete consensus on the thesis that judgments have become too long in recent years and commentators unfavourably compare modern judges to Willes, Blackburn and Macnaghten. I suppose in this accusation one has to confess and try to avoid this, but there are many reasons, practical and otherwise, why it should be done.
One of them was beautifully described by Newark, op cit, p. 265: « It is understandable why Lord Abiger`s judgments were brief, given that he wrote them in his own hand by the light of a gutter candle and used a pen that had to be sharpened frequently. » His analysis reinforces the important audience factor with respect to MBF Investments v Nolan [2011] VSCA 114, a single judgment of a three-judge Victoria Court of Appeal, in a complex mortgage case totaling approximately 30,000 words. The author complains that the litigants had to pay twice: once for the litigation and once for the costs of their lawyers, which explain the prolific and almost inscrutable judgment of the court. Justice Arden will no doubt be pleased to learn that the professor described her judgment in Cherry Tree Investments v Landmain [2012] EWCA Civ 736 as « a masterful but also very readable treatment of the facts and the law. » The use of Latin, although increasingly monitored, is one of the established features of common law systems around the world. Some judges continue to advocate the use of Latinisms in their judgments. There are sentences that summarize a concept, principle, maxim or doctrine in a way that the English language cannot match. Think, for example, of audi alteram partem, nemo judex in causa sua, res judicata, ignorantia lexis non excusat, ad hoc, per incuriam, bona fide et pro tanto. And certainly the elegance and conciseness of the delegatus non potest delegare has no competition in the English language. If this declaration was made in the context of a decision of an administrative authority, the same considerations apply exactly to judicial decisions.
I would just like to add one last point: well, and clearly reasoned decisions tend to be confirmed in the appeal: verbum sapienti satis. If a case is not reported in a full-text legal report, but a transcript of the judgment is available, it may be cited in conjunction with a summary report. However, the combination of a summary report and a transcript does not have the same status as a full-text legal report, if one exists, for reasons that become evident when one considers the amount of painstaking editorial work required to produce the full report. As it is true. Busy judges sometimes protest that they do not have the luxury of the time needed to write shorter judgments. There is no self-contradiction in this statement: it is one of the fundamental truisms of the modern legal world. In simple terms, this means that the court has reserved its judgment, as opposed to the so-called ex tempore judgment, which is pronounced in court as soon as the trial is over. If it is reproduced in a record at the end of a judgment, it indicates that the judgment was examined (reserved) rather than rendered ex tempore. The term has not been used in House of Lords reports. Instead, there is an expression such as « Your Lordships needed time to think » or « Your Lordships took time to think. » [7] In the Scottish courts, the word avizandum is used in the same way. Newark`s favourite is the « historic judgment, » such as that of Lord Macnaghten in Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495, which implements the principle enshrined in precedent without going through what he calls the « dark test » of adversarial judgments in earlier cases. Such judgments are quite admirable, but I would only say that they do require very high level of skill, knowledge and experience and should generally only be attempted by the high courts of appeal.
Professor F.H. Newark in his article « The Anatomy of a Law Report » (1965) 16 disapproved of NILQ 371 (reproduced in the book of his writings Elegantia Juris, S. 266) the use of the common form of the judgment, which he regarded somewhat as the mark of a pedestrian judge, but knowledge of its structure is a useful starting point: « The most common form – it could even be called the model of the `common form` of the judgment – is as follows.
