At common law, a precedent is a rule of law established by previous court proceedings that subsequent courts may follow when deciding cases involving similar issues or facts. The term can also be used to refer to case law, which as a whole provides guidance to judges on how to interpret the law. When a new legal principle is introduced or the law is amended on a subject, the precedent created is called a « policy decision ». [1] A precedent is a principle or rule established in a previous court case that is binding or persuasive, without a court or other tribunal being seized when subsequent cases are decided with similar questions or facts. [1] [2] [3] Common law systems place great importance on deciding cases according to consistent rules of principle so that similar facts lead to similar and predictable results, and adherence to precedent is the mechanism by which this objective is achieved. The principle that judges are bound by precedent is known as stare decisis (a Latin phrase with the literal meaning of « to stand in the things that have been decided »). The common law precedent is a third type of law, equal to statutory law (i.e. laws and codes promulgated by legislative bodies) and subordinate laws (i.e. regulations issued by law enforcement agencies in the form of delegated laws) – in British parlance – or regulatory law (in American parlance). As Colin Starger has pointed out, the contemporary rule of stare decisis, derived from Brandeis` innovative dissent in Burnet, then split into strong and weak notions following the disagreement between Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall of Payne v. Tennessee (1991).
[39] Strong design requires « special justification » to prevail over contested precedents beyond the fact that precedent was « ill-decided, » while weak design states that a precedent may be overturned if it suffers from « bad reasoning. » [39] However, the practice notice was rarely used by the House of Lords, usually only as a last resort. Until 2005, the House of Lords rejected its previous decisions only 20 times. [42] They were reluctant to use it for fear of introducing uncertainty into the law. In particular, the practice statement indicated that the Lords would be particularly reluctant to reject each other in criminal cases, as this law was important. The first criminal case to be overturned by the practice notice was Anderton v. Ryan (1985), which was lifted two decades after R. v. Shivpuri`s (1986) statement of practice. Remarkably, the repealed precedent was only created a year earlier, but it was criticized by several academic jurists. As a result, Lord Bridge stated that he was « not discouraged by the consideration that Anderton`s decision against Ryan was so new. The practice statement is an effective task of our claim to infallibility.
If a serious error in a decision of this House has distorted the law, the sooner it is corrected, the better. [43] Nevertheless, in some cases, the House of Lords was reluctant to override it; In R. v. Kansal (2002), the majority of members of the House of Representatives agreed that R. v. Lambert had been wrongly decided and agreed to depart from his earlier decision. A precedent refers to a judicial decision that is considered an authority to decide subsequent cases involving identical or similar facts or similar legal issues. The precedents are included in the doctrine of stare decisis and require courts to apply the law equally to cases involving the same facts. Some judges have stated that precedents ensure that people in similar situations are treated equally, rather than on the basis of the personal opinions of a particular judge. Law professors in common law traditions play a much smaller role in the development of jurisprudence than professors in civil law traditions.
Because court decisions in civil law traditions are short and not likely to set precedents, much of the interpretation of law in civil law traditions is done by academics rather than judges; this is called teaching and can be published in treatises or journals such as the Recueil Dalloz in France. Historically, common law courts have relied little on case law; it was therefore very rare at the turn of the century for an academic writer to be quoted in a legal decision (except perhaps for the academic writings of eminent judges such as Coke and Blackstone). Today, academic authors are often cited as a persuasive authority in legal arguments and decisions; Often, they are cited when judges attempt to implement arguments that other courts have not yet adopted, or when the judge feels that the academic`s reformulation of the law is more persuasive than is the case in previous ones. Common law systems thus adopt one of the approaches that have long been common in civil law systems. U.S. courts of last resort recognize a rebuttable presumption against the annulment of their own prior decisions. In earlier eras, it has often been argued that this presumption does not apply if the current members of the Court believe that the previous decision was manifestly erroneous. But when the Supreme Court makes similar noises today, it is outright criticized. At least within the academy, conventional wisdom now claims that an alleged demonstration of errors is not sufficient to justify an earlier decision.
[T]he conventional wisdom is wrong to suggest that any consistent doctrine of stare decisis must include a presumption against precedent-setting that the present Court clearly considers to be false. In fact, the doctrine of stare decisis would not be a doctrine at all if courts were free to overturn a previous decision simply because they arrived at a different decision than an original question. However, when a court asserts that an earlier decision is manifestly erroneous, it is not only saying that it would have rendered a different decision than the original case, but also that the previous court went beyond the realm of vagueness created by the relevant source of law. Americans have believed all along that court decisions could help « liquidate » or clarify the meaning of ambiguous provisions of written law. Subsequent courts should generally confine themselves to these « liquidations ». However, to the extent that the underlying legal provision is specified, it has not been assumed that the courts were also bound by precedents that they had misinterpreted. Among the current members of the Court, Justices Scalia and Thomas seem to have the greatest confidence in the accuracy of the legal texts submitted to the Court. Not surprisingly, they also seem the most willing to overturn the Court`s previous decisions. Prominent journalists and other commentators point out that there is a certain contradiction between the mantra of « judicial restraint » of these judges and a systematic examination of precedents. However, if one believes in the certainty of the underlying legal texts, one must define « judicial deference » not only in terms of precedent; We can also speak of fidelity to the texts themselves. Over time, courts in the United States, and the Supreme Court in particular, have developed various judicial decisions called « precedents. » These « rules and principles established in previous cases feed into future decisions of the Court of Justice ». [30] Compliance with the rules and principles established in previous cases as the basis for future court decisions is referred to as stare decisis.
The U.S. Supreme Court considers stare decisis not only an important doctrine, but also « the means by which we ensure that the law not only changes in unpredictable ways, but evolves in an understandable and principled manner. » [31] Stare decisis aims to strengthen the legitimacy of the judicial process and promote the rule of law. This is done by enhancing stability, security, predictability, consistency and consistency in the application of the law to cases and litigants. [30] By adhering to stare decisis, the Supreme Court seeks to preserve its role « as a prudent, impartial and predictable decision-maker who decides cases in accordance with the law and not according to the individual political preferences of judges. » [30] In Vasquez v. Hillery (1986), the Supreme Court succinctly stated that stare decisis « contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in its actions » by maintaining the notion « that fundamental principles are based on law and not on the inclinations of individuals. » [31] Any court may attempt to distinguish its present case from that of an enforceable precedent in order to reach a different conclusion. The validity of such a distinction may or may not be recognized on appeal. An appellate court may also propose an entirely new and different analysis from that of the lower courts and may or may not be bound by its own previous decisions or, in any event, it may distinguish those decisions on the basis of significant differences in the facts applicable in each case. Or a court may view the case before it as a « first impression » that is not subject to precedent. [7] Precedent is a legal principle created by a judicial decision that provides an example or authority for judges who later decide similar issues. In general, decisions of higher courts (within a particular court system) are binding precedents for lower courts in that system.
