I therefore deny that this is the « unequivocal conclusion of this court for nearly 50 years » that « students » and « teachers » take constitutional rights to « freedom of expression or opinion » right to the « school gate. » Even Meyer didn`t think so. He does not mention « symbolic speech » at all; what she did was declared « unreasonable » and therefore unconstitutional by a Nebraska law banning the teaching of the German language until she reached eighth grade. One can agree with Holmes and Sutherland JJ., as I do, that such a law was no more unreasonable than prohibiting the teaching of Latin and Greek to students who have not reached grade eight. In fact, I think the reason for the invalidity of the Nebraska Act for the majority was that they didn`t like it or, in legalese, that it « shocked the conscience of the court, » « violated its sense of law, » or was « contrary to the fundamental concepts of the English-speaking world, » as the Court has sometimes put it. See, for example, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 and Irvine v.
California, 347 U.S. 128, 74 S.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561. The truth is that a kindergarten, high school or high school teacher does not have a complete right to freedom of expression and opinion in a school, any more than an anti-Catholic or anti-Semite exercises complete freedom of expression and religion in a Catholic church or Jewish synagogue. In addition, a person in the United States Senate or House of Representatives or the Supreme Court or any other court has with him the full constitutional right to visit such places contrary to his rules and to express his opinion on any matter he wishes. It is a myth that every person has the constitutional right to say what they want, where they want and when they want. This Court has held exactly the opposite. See, for example, Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555, 85, pp. 453, 464, 13 L.Ed.2d 471; Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 pp. 242, 17 L.Ed. 149. « In the absence of a clear statement of constitutionally valid grounds for their speech, students have the right to freedom of expression. It can hardly be argued that students or teachers have waived their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school gate.
Judge Abe Fortas, speaking for the majority This case examines the legal concept of freedom of expression. John and Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt of Des Moines, Iowa, wore black armbands in their public school as a symbol of protest against American involvement in the Vietnam War. School authorities asked the students to remove their armbands, and they were later suspended. The Supreme Court ruled that students had the right to wear armbands because they did not interfere with the educational mission of the school. Judge Abe Fortas said no one expected students to « exercise their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school gate. » Tinker remains a viable and oft-cited precedent, and court decisions citing Tinker have both protected and limited the scope of students` freedom of expression. Tinker became Papish v. Board of Trustees of the University of Missouri in 1973, which ruled that expelling a student for distributing a newspaper on campus containing what the school considered « indecent speech » violated the First Amendment. In Bethel School District v. 1986 Fraser, the Supreme Court held that a high school student`s speech of sexual innuendo at a school meeting was not constitutionally protected.
The court said the protection of student political speech created in the Tinker case did not extend to vulgar language in a school setting. The Court held that similar language may be constitutionally protected when used by adults to defend a political point of view, but that this protection does not apply to students in a public school. In the 1980s, the Court created exceptions for Tinker in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser (1986), Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (1988) and Morse v. Frederick (2007). In Fraser, the court allowed school officials to regulate vulgar, obscene and clearly offensive speech by students, and in Hazelwood, it created a softer standard of relevance for reviewing the regulation of school-sponsored expression by school officials.
