The state has a particularly important role to play, as it can both enforce and withdraw property rights.² If their legal systems allow, states can confiscate private sector property if they believe it is not being used in a socially responsible manner. Corruption occurs when a state (or other individual actor) abuses the power entrusted to it for private gain. If legal institutions are not strong enough, the state can get away with it. There are many other examples of legal institutions shaping the economy. Everything from consumer protection laws that regulate what can and cannot be sold to labour laws that regulate the age at which it is acceptable for a child to work, forms the backdrop to how our economies work. One legal institution that is really crucial in determining how the economy works is that of property rights. Without private property, extended markets could not exist – how would we trade things if we could not own them? I first noted this distinction in « Structuring Legal Institutions, » in: Law and Philosophy 17,3 (1998a), Special Issue: Laws, Institutions and Facts, 215-232, at 228. MacCormick`s reaction in the same question was as follows: « Ruiter proposes that the typology of rules be expanded to include, in addition to `rules of follow-up`, what he calls `rules of content` to allow for the way in which general law can and cannot be contained in a particular regime that instantiates a particular (abstract) institution. He is certainly right about what he says, although, for the sake of simplicity, I would be inclined to rephrase the definition of « monitoring rules » to reflect that. Neil MacCormick, `Norms, Institutions, and Institutional Facts`, Law and Philosophy 17,3(1998), 301-345, pp.
337-8. The question is to what extent legal institutions support or hinder the proper functioning of the economy. Development economists sometimes divide them into pro-development institutions or promoters of the market for knowledge.³ For example, a law prohibiting child labour could be considered pro-development because a developed society should not allow children to work below a certain age. But it is also binding on the market because it controls what can and cannot be traded from above. Legal institutions can be roughly characterized as independent legal systems that regulate certain forms of social behaviour within the universal legal system. The characteristic of legal institutions is that they can be treated as social phenomena in their own right. Whatever our religion, social background and personal values, the only system to which we are all subject is « the law ». Not everyone agrees with laws – gun laws, drug laws, and citizenship laws are highly controversial, to name a few. But overall, the laws are supposed to be as close as possible to a neutral set of rules that anyone can follow. Economies are shaped by the legal systems in which they reside – what can and cannot be traded, what is fair and what is not, what can and cannot be. Provided by Springer Nature SharedIt Content-Sharing Initiative See for questions related to singular terms, some descriptions, proper names, designation and reference to Danny D.
Steinberg and Leon A. Jakobovits. Semantics. Interdisciplinary reader in philosophy, linguistics and psychology. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1971): Leonard Linksy, `Reference and Referents`, 76-85; P.F. Strawson, « Identifying Reference and Truth-values, » 86–99; Keith Donellan, « Reference and Definite Descriptions, » 100–114; Zeno Vendler, `Singular Terms`, 115-113. All contributions are reprinted. We will update recent executive orders and other measures by the President of the United States as they are issued by the White House.
We`ve compiled some of our favorite resources for getting information on U.S. legislative, regulatory, judicial, and executive responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and compiled them for you here. See them here Learn more about us and help us support our work. LII now publishes state regulations for all 50 U.S. states. Ruiter, D.W.P. (2001). Legal institutions. In: Rechtsinstitutionalen. Library of Law and Philosophy, volume 55. doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9765-4_4 Copyright © 2020 Elsevier B.V.
or its licensors or contributors. ScienceDirect ® is a registered trademark of Elsevier B.V. About ScienceDirect Shopping Cart Contact and SupportTerms and ConditionsPrivacy Policy The translation of the provisions of the French Constitution comes from Finer, Bogdanor and Rudden (1995), 214-215. Unfortunately, there are currently no shareable links available for this article. Please have it handy while we check your browser. These keywords were added by machine, not by the authors. This process is experimental and keywords can be updated as the learning algorithm improves. Anyone with whom you share the following link can read this content: We believe that everyone should be able to read and understand the laws that govern them for free. We implement this vision by: We use cookies to provide and improve our service and personalize content and advertisements. By continuing, you agree to the use of cookies.
MacCormick and Weinberger (1986); Ruiter (1993), 208th Ross (1957), 817–821; Alf Ross, « Definition in Legal Language. » Logic and Analysis, 1 (1958b), 139-149, p. 145. Tû-Tû` 70 (1957) Harvard Law Review. 812–825, c. 812. This article is contained in the contract under the heading pacta sunt servanda. Neil MacCormick and Ota Weinberger. Eine institutionalelle Rechtstheorie.
New approaches to legal positivism. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1986), 54 Ross (1957), 820; Ross (1958a), 170-172; Ruiter (1993), 210. Dick W.P. Ruiter. « Institutions normatives et réels » in: Bernard Steunenberg and Frans van Vught, Political Institutions and Public Policy. Prospects for European decision-making. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997c), 67-81, at 73-74.
